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Abstract 
 
Egyptian Revolution, also known as Arab Spring or Arab Uprising, was a shock for 
international community because Egypt has been seen as one of the strongest 
military state in North Africa region. Experts and observers even suggested that this 
revolution is the biggest event since the Cold War. No one ever saw this coming; yet, 
the Revolution happened, and it succeeded to topple President Hosni Mubarak from 
power. Indeed, prior to the revolution, there are factors that became the preliminary 
incidents as well as problems that led to the revolution, and most of these factors 
came from within the country. Nevertheless, this revolution has given idea to other 
states with repressive regime in the North Africa region, which started the ‘domino 
effect’ in Middle East and North Africa region. As for Egyptians, though 
successfullnes of the revolution brought positive outcome for them, the negative 
result also followed as well as responses from international community. The 
objective of this paper is to examine the Egyptian Revolution that led to the end of 
Hosni Mubarak regime. 
 
Keywords: Arab Spring; Egyptian Revolution; President Hosni Mubarak; 
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Introduction 
It is well known to the world that in 
Middle East-North Africa region, 
reppressive regime has endured for decades, 
and Egypt is not an exception. In fact, 
according to Freedom House’s data of 2007, 
Egypt was one of the countries in Africa 
region that became “more repressive but 
remained within the same category”.1 
Indeed, this was not the first time for 
Egyptians to revolt against Mubarak: they 
have been doing this since long ago2, but 
they never succeeded. Then suddenly, there 
was uprisings throughout Middle East-North 
Africa region that startled the experts and 
observers. Started in Tunisia, this 
demonstration then spreaded throughout the 
Middle East-North Africa region, brought a 
destruction to the dictatorship by people’s 
demands to topple the regime (for example, 
                                                           
1 Paul D. Williams, ‘Thinking about Security in  
Africa’, International Affairs, vol. 83, no. 6, 2007, p. 
1023. 
2 Prior to the revolution, there were a lot of  
demonstrations; the recent demonstrations are the 
Kefaya Movement and The April 6 Movement. The 
April 6 Movement was the one that inspired the 
youngsters in Egypt to use social media (Facebook 
and Twitter) for the first time to gather people under 
the name “We Are All Khaled Said”. This name was 
used in order to honour a businessman named Khaled 
Said who died on June 2010, and also marked the 
brutality of policemen. (Mohamed Elshahed, 
‘Breaking the Fear Barrier of Mubarak’s Regime, 
The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) 
Website, http://www.ssrc.org/pages/breaking-the-
fear-barrier-of-mubarak-s-regime/, consulted 8 
January 2014). 
in Tunisia and Egypt) and an unrest situation 
to all of the authoritarian regimes in Middle 
East-North Africa countries. In Egypt’s 
case, this is the first time Egyptians 
succeeded their revolt against Mubarak.  
Research Method 
This research paper applies a 
qualitative analysis by using journals, books, 
news reports, commentaries, etc. As the 
main sources to illustrate the critical 
debates. Since there are series of Arab 
Spring, this paper will limit its discussion to 
Egyptian Revolution on 25 January 2011 
until the fall of Hosni Mubarak. In order to 
do so, the discussion on this paper is divided 
into two sections. 
Substantially, this essay will discuss 
about the Egyptian 25 January revolution 
and how the world responds to it. In essence, 
this essay will be divided into two sections. 
The first section will describe the situation 
during Arab Spring in Egypt, including the 
reason behind the event. The second section 
will discuss the impact of the Arab Spring 
on Egypt, and how western countries 
responded to this event. In the last, this 
essay will be ended by a conclusion in 
which I will argue that Egyptian Revolution, 
as part of Arab Spring, is one of the biggest 
event after the Cold War given how this 
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event got responses from all over the world, 
and yet, with its own characteristic. 
 The ‘Arab Spring’ 
‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Uprisings’ or 
‘Arab Awakening’ is a term that used to 
describe a series of protests and 
demonstrations that happened in North 
Africa-Middle East countries since the late 
2010.3 This event started in Tunisia on 18 
December 2010 after the death of 
Muhammad Bouazizi from Sidi Bouzid4, 
then spread throughout Middle East-North 
Africa countries such as Yemen, Syria, 
Bahrain, Algeria, Morocco, etc.5 (also 
known as a ‘domino effect’); however, it is 
Egypt that introduce the term of ‘Arab 
                                                           
3 UCDP, ‘Arabian Spring’, Uppsala Conflict Data  
Program Website, 23 December 2011, 
www.ucdp.uu.se/database/, consulted on 28 
November 2013, p. 2.  
4 He burnt himself with combustible liquid after the  
humiliation he got in front of governor’s office, and 
died on 4 January 2011 (International Crisis Group, 
‘Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East 
(IV): Tunisia’s Way’, Crisis Group Middle 
East/North Africa Report, no. 106, 28 April 2011, p. 
3.). This incidents then stimulated anger from 
Tunisians and, after it has been aired through media, 
thousands of Arab people around the continent. As a 
result, the Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens 
(UGTT) conducted a demonstration on Saturday 18 
December 2010. This event ended with a flight of 
President Ben Ali into an exile in Saudi Arabia where 
he finally gets his punishment for violence and 
murdering around hundreds of rebels. (Jeremy 
Bowen, Arab Uprisings: The People Want the Fall of 
the Regime, London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd., 
2012, p. 35-46.)    
5 Abdelkader Abdelali, ‘Wave of Change in the Arab  
World and Chances for a Transition to Democracy’, 
Contemporary Arab Affairs, vol. 6, no. 2, 2013, p. 
198. 
Spring’ to western media after its revolution 
on 25 January 2011. ‘Arab Spring’ started in 
the middle of winter, which made it seemed 
irrelevant if we called the event that 
happened as ‘Arab Spring’6; yet, this is the 
term that western media popularized, which 
based on a tide of democracy in the wake of 
Iraq incursion on 2005.7 Moreover, because 
of the ‘domino effect’ that characterizes it, 
the term of ‘Arab spring’ itself is also often 
referred to European Revolution in 1848 and 
1989 by media and experts such as Henry E. 
Hale, Jack A. Goldstone, etc.8  
Nevertheless, Jack A. Goldstone in 
his article Understanding the Revolutions of 
2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle 
Eastern Authocracies argued that we should 
not assume those cases as the same9. They 
are the same revolution, but with different 
purpose. While European revolution in 1848 
was about people’s demand to overthrow the 
traditional monarchy regimes, and 1989 was 
intended to end the Communist regime, the 
                                                           
6 Stephan Rosiny, ‘The Arab Spring: Triggers,  
Dynamics, and Prospects’, German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Focus, no. 1, 2012, 
p. 2. 
7 UCDP, p. 3. 
8 Henry E. Hale, ‘Regime Change Cascades: What  
We Have Learned from the 1848 Revolutions to the 
2011 Arab Uprisings’, The Annual Review of 
Political Science, vol. 16, 2013, p. 332.  
9 Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Understanding the Revolutions  
of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern 
Authocracies’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3, 2011, 
p. 8. 
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Arab spring has its own characteristics that 
differentiate it with European Revolutions. 
Arab Spring is a revolution which purpose is 
to overturn modern sultanate throughout the 
continent, but not necessarily change or 
overthrown the government. Another 
difference is while revolution in Europe was 
actuated by external forces, in Egypt, it was 
internal factors that became the engine of 
revolution.10  
In Egypt, revolution started on 25 
January, which was a national holiday. It is a 
Police Day: the day when Egyptians recall a 
British attack on a police station in 
Ismailiyya in 1952. President Mubarak 
himself declared in 2004 that 25 January is a 
symbol of “patriotism and sacrifice”, so 
Egyptians could show their admiration 
towards police.11 However, Egyptians did 
not think the same: for them, police was 
merely a very corrupt, ill trained, has no 
respect towards human rights12, and a brutal 
instrument of President Hosni Mubarak. 
Now, Egyptians have had enough of police 
                                                           
10 Noha Bakr, ‘The Egyptian Revolution’, in Stephen  
Calleya and Monika Wohlfeld (ed.), Change and 
Opportunities in the Emerging Mediterranean, 2012, 
http://www.um.edu.mt/data/assets/pdf_file/0004/150
394/, consulted on 2 November 2013, p. 68-69.  
11 Steven A. Cook, The Struggle for Egypt: From  
Nasser to Tahrir Square, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012, p. 281. 
12 Spindel, Chad, ‘The People Want to Topple the  
Regime: Exploring the Arab Spring in Egypt, Syria, 
and Jordan’, Sage Open, November 2011, p. 3  
brutality, and they wanted the Emergency 
Law to be eliminated. A successful 
Tunisia’s revolution eleven days before 
buoyed Egyptian (anti-Mubarak) activists; 
gave them spirit and hope to organize and 
convene people through Facebook and 
Twitter to protest against Hosni Mubarak. 
However, Egyptian security service has 
prepared: government spread police officers, 
Central Security Forces (CSF) troops, and 
agents as civilians around the Ministry of 
Interior on Sheikh Rihan Street through 
Tahrir Square.13   
These anticipations seemed a 
successful tactic from Minister of Interior, 
Habib al Adly; conversely, it was not. The 
law enforcement officers may have access to 
some access routes, but beyond those routes, 
it was the people who took control.  As a 
result, around noon, people from all across 
Egypt poured into the streets and moved 
towards Tahrir Square and parliament. They 
took a route through the ancient Qasr al-Nil 
bridge, infiltrated security barriers, and lined 
up in small groups through the Nile 
Corniche from the southern and northern 
district whilst shouted for Karama (dignity) 
and Hurriyah (freedom)14.  
                                                           
13 Cook, p. 282. 
14 Ann M. Lesch, ‘Egypt’s Spring: Causes of the  
Revolution’, Middle East Policy Council Website, 
2013, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-
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As a response, the police fired tears 
gas to stop the demonstrators, but they 
countered back by throwing stones and 
bricks. In the late afternoon, it seemed like 
nearly 90.000 people occupied the Tahrir 
Square (Liberation Square) which became a 
headquarters of the revolution15. By night, 
the demonstrators were suppressed to Qasr 
al Aini Street, and half miles back to the 
Square by hundreds of troops from CSF who 
used shields, batons, and metal pipes. What 
astonishing from that night was while most 
of young policemen worked hard to control 
the riot in Tahrir Square, senior police 
officers enjoyed and celebrated their Police 
Day-break in the Semiramis Intercontinental 
Hotel, not far away from Tahrir Square.16 
Moreover, according to Minister of 
Interior, until 26 January, they have arrested 
around 500 people.17 On 27 January, 
                                                                                       
policy-archives/egypts-spring-causes-revolution, 
consulted 16 September 2013. 
15 This is why Egyptian Revolution is also known as  
Tahrir Revolution. For the demonstrans, Tahrir 
square did not symbolize their freedom and 
emancipation (because ‘Tahrir’ means ‘Liberation’ in 
Arabic), but it was a symbol of public space 
degradation under 30 years of Mubarak’s regime. 
They chose this place for mass gathering simply 
because they share this public space together and 
protect it from regime’s tyranny. After the revolution, 
Tahrir square then symbolizes the changing in 
society. (Ahmad Shokr, ‘The Eighteen Days of 
Tahrir’ in Jeannie Sowers and Chris Toensing (ed.), 
The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and 
Social Change in Egypt, London: Verso, 2012, p. 42).    
16 Cook, p. 284. 
17 Sherine El Madany and Yasmine Saleh, ‘Egypt on  
government cut the internet and mobile 
services18, and on 28 January, situation was 
getting critical: hundreds of thousands of 
people throughout the country conflicted 
with the police and central security forces, 
and even tried to take over the Ministry of 
Interior.19 This situation was too 
overwhelming, caused the police finally 
stepped back and military took over the 
situation at night, which gave an impression 
that Mubarak has lost his control over the 
country.20 Indeed, this situation was marked 
as a turning point in Egyptians revolution. 
On Saturday 29 January early 
morning, Mubarak made a speech, 
addressing to the nation that he will dismiss 
the government and form the new 
government in the next day, but he will stay 
as a president.21 Later that day, Mubarak 
dismissed the government and designated 
                                                                                       
Edge as Demonstrations Turn Violent’, Reuters 
Website, 26 January 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/, 
consulted 31 October 2013. 
18 Mona El-Ghobashy, ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian  
Revolution’ in Jeannie Sowers and Chris Toensing 
(ed.), The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and 
Social Change in Egypt, London: Verso, 2012, p. 35. 
19 Cook, p. 285. 
20 Jeremy M. Sharp, ‘Egypt: The January 25  
Revolution and Implications for U.S Foreign Policy’, 
Congressional Research Service Report, 11 February 
2011, p. 3. 
21 Yasmine Saleh and Dina Zayed, ‘Highlights:  
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s Speech’, 
Reuters Website, 29 January 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/29/us-egypt-
mubarak-speech-id USTRE07S0SA20110129, 
consulted 6 November 2013. 
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two military personnel: Omer Suleiman 
(National Intelligent Chief) as his Vice 
President, and Ahmad Shafiq (Civil 
Aviation Minister) as Prime Minister.22 
However, Egyptians did not want it. They 
wanted Mubarak to step down. Yet, until 30 
January 2011, Mubarak still resisted to 
retreat, while damage from the revolution 
has advanced: around 300 people have been 
killed, Egyptian stock market has collapsed, 
trading has stopped, and most of all, 
Egyptian tourism has crashed.23 It was 
obvious that the longer revolution continues, 
the more damage will happen. 
On Monday 31 January 2011, 
Egyptian army announced that they will not 
use force against Mubarak. It seemed as the 
end of Mubarak regime, yet he still resisted. 
In that morning, the new Vice President 
Omer Suleiman announced on Egyptian 
television, on President Hosni Mubarak 
behalf, that they will conduct a new 
parliamentary election in district.24 In 
response, African Union demanded a fair 
election in Egypt.25 Moreover, still in the 
same day, Mubarak ordered his new Prime 
                                                           
22 Sharp, p. 3. 
23 Sharp, p. 3. 
24 Sharp, p. 6. 
25 Mikael Eriksson and Kristina Zetterlund, ‘Dealing  
with Change: EU and AU Responses to the Uprisings 
in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya’, FOI Website, January 
2013, http://www.foi.se, p. 41. 
Minister for the continuation of government 
subsidies and price reduction.26 
In addition, on Tuesday 1 February 
2011, Mubarak made his second appeal to 
the nation by saying that he will amend the 
constitution, especially article 76 and 77 
regarding the presidential. At the end of his 
speech, Mubarak said, 
“Hosni Mubarak who speaks to you 
today is proud of the long years he spent 
in the service of Egypt and its people. 
This dear nation is my country, it is the 
country of all Egyptians, here I have 
lived and fought for its sake and I 
defended its land, its sovereignty and 
interests and on this land I will die and 
history will judge me and others for our 
merits and faults.”27 
 
This appeal was apparently able to 
win people’s sympathy since they asked the 
rioters to end the demonstration.28 However, 
this situation was not lasted long: people’s 
rage generated again on the following day 
and 3 February when violent clash happened 
around Tahrir Square between pro-
democracy protesters and Mubarak’s 
                                                           
26 Anonymous, ‘Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution’,  
Aljazeera Website, 14 February 2011, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/
201112515334871490.html, consulted 6 November 
2011. 
27 Anonymous, ‘Hosni Mubarak’s Speech: Full Text’,  
The Guardian Website, 2 February 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/02/presi
dent-hosni-mubarak-egypt-speech, consulted 6 
November 2013. 
28 Rana Muhammad Taha, Hend Kortam, and Nouran  
el-Behairy, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mubarak’, Daily 
News Egypt Website, 11 February 2013, 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/11/the-rise-
and-fall-of-mubarak/, consulted 6 November 2013. 
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opponents.29 At least, 1.500 people were 
injured, and at the end of the day, three of 
them died. 
Since that day, demonstrations kept 
to continue, demanding Mubarak to step 
down with the level of violent increased 
every day. Then, finally, on 11 February 
2011, after 18 days of demonstration and 
violent, Vice President Suleiman announced 
that President Hosni Mubarak stepped down 
after 29 years 120 days of his presidency, 
handed over his power to Supreme Council 
of the Egyptian Armed Forces.30 In 18 days 
revolution, approximately 846 Egyptians 
were killed whereas around 6467 rioters 
were wounded.31  
This phenomenon was definitely 
exceptional. Egypt seemed strong and 
normal; what happened in Tunisia was not a 
guarantee that Egypt will follow the same 
path. Even Egyptians were still unsure about 
what will happen in their country one day 
prior to the revolution.32 There is no doubt 
that this incident brought a shock to the 
world since no one expecting this event will 
happen in Egypt. In its publication, 
                                                           
29 Anonymous, ‘Timeline: Egypt’s Revolution’. 
30 Taha Ӧzhan, ‘New Egypt versus the Felool:  
Struggle for Democracy’, Insight Turkey, vol. 15, no. 
1, 2013, p. 13.  
31 Bakr, p. 68. 
32 Cook, p. 282. 
POMEPS supports this opinion by stating 
that 
“What made January 25 extraodinary 
was not that Egyptians protested against 
Mubarak regime – that had been 
happening for a decade. What made it 
extraordinary was that for the first time, 
hundreds of thousands of ordinary, non 
activist Egyptians joined them on the 
streets to demand the overthrow of the 
regime”.33 
Moreover, Lisa Anderson (in her 
article Demystifying the Arab Spring: 
Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, 
Egypt, and Libya), added that the pattern of 
Egyptian revolution was also unique: it was 
driven by the youngsters and city people.34  
Still, 25 January Revolution was not 
coming out of the void. There are three 
preliminary demonstrations that led to the 
biggest revoution in one of North Africa 
powerful state. One of these demonstrations 
is the Kefaya Movement. Kefaya means 
“enough” in Arabic. This movement was 
established in the early 2000s in order to 
criticize the Mubarak administration for 
doing nothing on the second Israeli intifada 
                                                           
33  POMEPS, ‘Arab Uprisings: The State of the  
Egyptian Revolution’, Project on Middle East 
Political Science (POMEPS), 7 September 2011, p. 3. 
34 Lisa Anderson, ‘Demystifying the Arab Spring:  
Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and 
Libya’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3, May/June 
2011, p. 2. 
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in Palestine. This has happend since 1979 
Camp David Agreement; however, in the 
early 2000s, around ten thousands students 
were demonstrating at Cairo University for 
the violent continuation of Israel troops 
towards Palestinians.35 This movement 
continued during 2003, and in 2004 and 
2005, it organized a series of demonstration, 
demanding for the termination of Mubarak 
regime and country’s emergency law.36 
In 2008, the youth activists from 
Kefaya Movement established an April 6th 
Youth Movement, which helped workers of 
a weaving company to protest to the 
government. This group succeeded to gather 
around 70.000 paticipants on Facebook 
under the name of “We Are All Khaled 
Said”.37 This name was used in honor of 
Khaled Said, a middle class man who died 
under the police brutality in Sidi Gaber, 
Alexandria on 6 June 2010. 
Indeed, there are reasons behind that 
revolution apart from the successful 
Tunisia’s revolution; the first is social 
problems. In his article, The Reasons for and 
the Impacts of the Egypt Revolution, Liao 
                                                           
35Ali Sarihan, ‘Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave  
of Democratization? The Case of Syria and Egypt’, 
Turkish Journal of Politics, vol. 3, no. 11, 2012, p. 
70. 
36 Dina Shehata, ‘The Fall of the Pharaoh: How  
Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Come to an End’, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 90, no. 3, 2011, p. 28.  
37 Shehata, p. 28. 
Baizhi discloses that Egypt is the highest 
density country in the Arab region with 
around 80 million people with“a child born 
on average every 23 seconds”.38 This high 
birth rate caused many problems in the 
society from environment to unemployment. 
Concerning the unemployment, Egypt 
indeed has a quite high unemployment rate; 
yet, not so high compared to the US and 
many European countries.39  
Still, Egypt’s unemployment rate 
was very high (8-11 per cent) compare to 
2007 unemployment rate that only 8.9 per 
cent, according to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP).40 Most 
of people who suffer are young people under 
29 years-old with partition: 18 per cent with 
high educational background, and around 
40-50 per cent with university degree. 
Moreover, there is a high differentiation 
between male and female concerning job’s 
opportunity, with 9 per cent for male and 19 
per cent for female until 2011.41 Each year, 
                                                           
38 Liao Baizhi, ‘The Reasons For and the Impacts of  
the Egypt Revolution’, Contemporary International 
Relations, vol. 21, no. 2, 2011, p. 120. 
 
39 Andrey V. Korotayev, Julia V. Zinkina, ‘Egyptian  
Revolution: A Demographic Structural Analysis’, 
Entelequia, no. 13, 2011, www.eumed.net/entelequia,  
consulted 7 November 2013, p. 145. 
40 Earl (Tim) Sullivan, ‘Youth Power and the  
Revolution’ in Dan Tschirgi, Walid Kazziha, and 
Sean F. McMahon (ed.), Egypt’s Tahrir Revolution, 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2013, p. 69.  
41 Nadia Ramsis Farah, ‘The Political Economy of  
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around 700.000 fresh graduate students 
competed for around 200.000 jobs with most 
of them failed.42 Without job, these young 
people has no income to finance their family 
or do what they want to do in their lives like 
other people. This situation then explains 
why most of the protesters were youngsters. 
The second reason is economic unrest. Prior 
to 25 January revolution, Egypt’s economy 
was growing: economy has increased up to 
7% in 2006-2008 (from 1981-2011, 
economy has grown 4,5 fold), exports in 
Egypt have tripled, and total cumulative 
foreign investment has reached 46 billion 
dollars in 2006-2009.43 Overall Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in Egypt also 
showed an improvement: increased from 
1.355 dollars in 1981 to 6.200 dollars in 
201044. During the financial crisis, Egypt 
economy was growing as well; annual 
economic growth rates was a little bit slow 
(from 7,2% to 4,6%), but it was still an 
                                                                                       
Egypt’s Revolution’ in Dan Tschirgi, Walid Kazziha, 
and Sean F. McMahon (ed.), Egypt’s Tahrir 
Revolution, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 
2013, p. 55. 
42 Duncan Green, ‘What Caused the Revolution in  
Egypt?’, The Guardian Website, 18 February 2011, 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/17/what-
caused-egyptian-revolution, consulted 2 January 
2014. 
43Bakr, p. 58. 
44 Ali Sarihan, ‘Is the Arab Spring in the Third Wave  
of Democratization?: The Case of Syria and Egypt’, 
Turkish Journal of Politics, vol. 3, no. 1, Summer 
2012, p. 75. 
achievement.45 Yet, those improvements did 
not benefit all the Egyptians: according to 
the CIA World Factbook, in 2010, inflation 
rate in Egypt was extreme at 12,8%46 
compare to 2009 with 18,3%47; moreover, 
approximately 2,5 million Egyptians lived 
on 2 dollars per day, and around 35-40% 
Egyptians lived below 2 dollars per day.48 
In addition, gap between the rich and 
poor was also astonishing: whereas around 
20% Egyptians lived under poverty line, 2-
3% of populations were labelled “rich” or 
“upper class”. Furthermore, Mubarak 
himself had saving around 40 billion dollars 
while his wife and sons kept 3-5 billion 
dollars in their personal account.49 When 
people deprecated this economic inequality, 
Mubarak arbitrarily either sent them to the 
jail or killed them. These facts then led to 
another cause of revolution: corruption, 
                                                           
45 Korotayev and Zinkina, p. 140. 
46 Find the Data, ‘CIA World Factbook 2010’, 8  
October 2013,  
http://cia-world-fact-
book.findthedata.org/l/1146/Egypt, consulted 6 
January 2014. 
 
 
 
 
47 Find the Data, ‘CIA World Factbook 2010’, 22  
October 2013, http://cia-world-fact-
book.findthedata.org/l/15/Egypt, consulted 6 January 
2014. 
48 Sarihan, p. 75. 
49 Sarihan, p. 75-76. 
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which attained its peak: Egypt is ranked 80 
in the world.50 
Another sector that generate the 
revolution is political unrest. Unlike 
monarchies where the sovereignty is 
hereditary, Egypt is a republic with 
authoritarian regime, which means 
precidency for life. Mubarak has governed 
Egypt for a very long time, and he intended 
to pass it to his son. This means that there is 
no chance for another competitor51. 
Furthermore, there was a suspicion that 
parliamentary election in 2010 was unfair in 
favour of the NDP (Mubarak’s party), which 
intended to secure the position for 
Mubarak’s son52. Added these to the fact 
that Mubarak handled the situation during 
the revolution by using brutality (he utilized 
tears gas, rubber bullets, and water 
cannons), he only generated people’s wrath, 
not alleviated it.53 
Also, there was a factor from outside 
the country, namely Tunisian Revolution. 
This may not necessarily give direct impact 
to Egyptian Revolution, but this event was a 
trigger for Egyptian Revolution since the 
same thing has happened in Egypt. 
                                                           
50 Bakr, p. 64. 
51 Bakr, p. 66. 
52 Dina Shehata, ‘The Fall of the Pharaoh: How  
Hosni Mubarak’s Reign Came to an End’, Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 90, no. 26, 2011, p. 29.   
53 Bakr, p. 66. 
Mohammed Al-Bouazizi’s story in Tunisia 
and Khaled Said’s story in Egypt have been 
the trigger for revolution to happen. Though 
what happened to both of them, Said 
especially, was not the first time in Egyptian 
brutal history, both of them represented 
middle class people who tried to make a 
living without any help from the 
government.54 Since the middle class was 
the peole who suffered the most, they felt 
related to Al-Bouazizi and Said.  
Tunisia, like Egypt has a strong 
military tradition, yet Tunisians were 
succeeded to overthrow President Ben Ali’s 
regime. This then gives hope for all the 
Egyptians to do the same.55 When we see 
the factors that generated Egyptian 
revolution one by one, the revolution 
seemed unreasonable. However, when these 
factors are combined together, revolution 
will be something that unavoidable. 
Impacts of and Responds for Arab Spring 
to Egypt 
During the Cold War, Middle East 
was one of the most crucial battlefield for 
the United States and Soviet Union: they 
                                                           
54 Abeer Yassin, ‘Understanding the Egyptian  
Revolution: People and De-Securitization’, DOI: 
10.7763/IPEDR, Vol. 48, no. 32, 2012, p. 150. 
55 Mustafa Kamel al-Sayyid, ‘What Went Wrong  
with Mubarak’s Regime?’ in Dan Tschirgi, Walid 
Kazziha, and Sean F. McMahon (ed.), Egypt’s Tahrir 
Revolution, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 
2013, p. 25. 
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were competed for influence, supplied 
weapons, cash, and political support56. This 
situation lasted until the United States won 
the war and become the most powerful 
player in the Africa continent, which means 
that the United States and other Western 
countries can control the Africa continent. 57 
Therefore, what happened in Egypt and 
other Middle East countries indeed gives 
impact to how Western countries see Egypt 
as well as impact to Egypt’s foreign policy.  
In terms of economy, Arab Spring 
has brought a huge impact to Egypt: 
Egyptian foreign exchange reserves 
plummeted up to around 21 billion dollars 
compared to before the revolution.58 This 
was also followed by deteriorations in 
foreign investment in Egypt (fall until 4,8 
billion USD for fiscal year 2010/2011) and 
Egypt stock exchanges; in addition, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) also showed a 
decline of 65 million USD, which is the 
lowest level in Egypt’s FDI.59  
In terms of foreign policy, it seems like 
there is no significant changes in Egyptian’s 
foreign policy. However, the new 
transitional government that run by SCAF, 
                                                           
56 Bowen, p. 13.  
57 Bowen, p. 13. 
58 Doaa S. Abdou and Zeinab Zaazou, ‘The Egyptian  
Revolution and Post Socio-Economic Impact’, Topics 
in Middle Eastern and African Economies, vol. 15, 
no. 1, May 2013, p. 98. 
59 Abdou and Zaazou, p. 98-99. 
has stated that Egypt intends to improve its 
relations with Iran since both countries have 
no formal relationship.60 This, as Halawa 
stated in Egypt Independent Website, has 
shown by Egypt allowing Iranian ships to 
sail through Suez Canal in February, just 
after Mubarak stepped down. Halawa then 
further explain that local newspaper even 
had preached that Iran has designated its 
ambassador to Egypt, which later denied by 
the Iranian government. Moreover, 
relationship with Iran is overlapping with 
reconciliation between Palestinian factions 
(Fatah and Hamas), which is pivotal in 
Egypt’s foreign policy.  
There are two consequences if Egypt 
succedeed to pull this policy: on the one 
hand, this normalization with Iran could 
help Palestinian reconciliation; on the other 
hand, it could construct tension between 
Egypt and Egypt’s oldest ally, namely Saudi 
Arabia. Considering this affair, Egyptian 
senior diplomat then stated that there will be 
no major changes in foreign policy. In his 
statement, he also mentioned that Egypt still 
keeps a careful alliance with Western 
countries and other Arab states, is still 
                                                           
60 Omar Halawa, ‘New Egyptian Foreign Policy  
Challenges Regional Alliances’, Egypt Independent 
Website, 20 April 2011, 
http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/new-
egyptian-foreign-policy-challenges-regional-
alliances, consulted 8 November 2013. 
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maintaining a good partnership with Israel, 
is not normalizing relations with Iran, and 
still keeps track of good relations with Nile 
Basin countries.61 
Since this was a big event in Arab 
world, response comes from not only 
regional communities but also international 
communities. From regional communities, 
respond comes from African Union (AU). 
As noted before, the African Union wanted 
Egypt to conduct a free election, and a 
government that respects people’s rights. 
However, it was just a statement. Though 
AU has several policy in regards of the 
“unconstitutional regime change”, it did not 
view the Egyptian revolution or Tunisian 
revolution as such of situation, which then 
explain why AU has not reacted properly; in 
fact, AU only reacted when the 
demonstration has become more violent.62 
Lack of instrument and proper action made 
AU becoming a dormant player in the 
region. 
As for international response to 
Egypt’s revolution, Egyptian revolution is a 
surprise. Since Egypt is still an important 
player in Middle East for Western countries, 
                                                           
61 Dina Ezzat, ‘Egypt’s Foreign Policy a Year after 
the Revolution’, Ahram Online, 26 January 2012, 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/114/3277
0/Egypt/-January-Revolution-continues/Egypts-
foreign-policy-a-year-after-the-revolution.aspx, 
consulted 8 November 2013. 
62 Eriksson and Zetterlund, p. 45. 
response came from everywhere. From 
European Union (EU), for example, 
response came as a support for human rights 
and democracy transition so that it can 
proceed in a peaceful way. In order to do 
this, the EU has provided technical 
assistance to help the authorities to manage 
an election in Egypt. As for the economic 
transition, the EU has provided around 449 
million Euro for the period 2011-2013. 
Furthermore, EU and Egypt also approved 
to scrutinize together the possibilities of 
deeper trade and investment relations, 
including a chance for a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA).63 
In addition, the response is not only 
come from European Union, but also from 
the United States. As the US ally, Egypt has 
got advantages from the US since 1980; as a 
return, Egypt is also the most important 
partner for the US peace process with 
Israel.64 Therefore, what happened in Egypt 
indeed disrupted what the US and President 
Hosni Mubarak has built since 1980. With 
                                                           
63 European Union, ‘EU’s Response to the “Arab  
Spring”: The State-of-Play after Two Years’, 
European Union, A 70/ 13, 8 February 2013, 
www.eeas.europa.eu, consulted 26 September 2013, 
p. 6. 
64 Philippe Droz-Vincent, ‘A Post-Revolutionary  
Egyptian Foreign Policy?... Not yet’, The German 
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), July 
2012, p. 1. 
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today’s revolution in Egypt, the US indeed 
needs to think a new approach that suitable 
for US-Egypt relations in the long term. 
During the Revolution, the US has 
demanded for President Hosni Mubarak to 
step down. However, during this transition 
process, what the US can do is supporting 
Egypt like the EU and not interfering in the 
election process.65 As for financial support, 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had 
proposed 150 million dollars for emergency 
aid (military assistance) to Egypt when she 
visited Cairo on February, and 250 million 
dollars for economic assistance.66 
Moreover, response also comes from 
Asian countries, such as China. Different 
with other countries mentioned above, China 
responded the revolution by limiting its 
people to get any details of information 
about Egyptian revolution.67 Since China 
and Egypt has quite a similar system68, 
                                                           
65 Emad El-Din Shahin, ‘The Arab Spring and  
Western Policy Choices’, Peace Policy Website, 6 
July 2011, www.peacepolicy.org, consulted 16 
September 2013. 
66 Uri Dadush and Michele Dunne, ‘American and  
European Responses to the Arab Spring: What’s the 
Big idea?’, The Washington Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4, 
p. 133. 
67 Nuh Yilmaz, Taha Ӧzhan, et all., SETA Policy  
Report: The Anatomy of Egyptian Revolution: From 
25th January to the New Constitution, no. 9, January 
2012, p. 35. 
68 Both China and Egypt has enjoyed the  
improvement in terms of economy with social gap in 
one side and political dissatisfying on the other side. 
This has created unrest situation in public. (Nuh 
Yilmaz, Taha Ӧzhan, et all., p. 36). 
China is clearly worried about the impact of 
Egyptian Revolution to itself. Added to the 
fact that China has also challenges from 
surrounding countries (for example, North 
Korea, Japan, etc.), Chinese government 
definitely wants to avoid bigger conflict 
from inside the country. 
Conclusion 
In summary, Egypt is a country that 
has suffered under dictatorship and corrupt 
regime for many years. This lengthy period 
was characterized by poverty, 
unemployment and political unrest. These 
characteristics then created a wide gap 
between the rich and poor people. A 
mentioned before, this is not the first time 
for Egyptians to revolt against their 
government, but this is the first time they 
gathered together to revolt against their 
government. Egyptian revolution was a 
shock for international society. As outsiders, 
people always perceive situation in Egypt 
was under control. Yet, revolution 
happened, and Peter Jones in his article even 
has categorized it as one of the biggest 
events after the Cold War, and it is not 
without reason: Egyptian Revolution, as part 
of Arab Spring, was a big event given the 
number of people who joined it, the shock, 
impacts, and responds from regional and 
international society.   
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Indeed, a successful Tunisia’s Revolution 
eleven days earlier was a generator for 
Egyptians to start their own revolution and 
changed their government. Yet, how it 
started was different, and Egyptian 
Revolution has its own characteristic: it was 
dominated by youngsters and city people, 
not activists. In addition, impact from this 
event to Egypt was also huge, not only in 
terms of economy,  but also politics. Since 
this is such a big event, there is no doubt 
that this will also bring responses from both 
regional and international communities such 
as the United States, European Union, 
African Union, etc. 
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